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INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

THE LOBBYING ACT: AN EFFECTIVE GUARDIAN
OF THE REPRESENTATIVE SYSTEM?
The disclosure that Senator Richard lMi. Nixon of California
used $18,235 from a privately created trust' to supplement his Senatorial expense account has evoked widespread interest and concern. The public's reaction emphasizes the belief that legislative
duties should be discharged with judicial impartiality. Neither the
charge nor the evidence has suggested that the money in question
was improperly or illegally expended ;2 indeed, it was not the propriety
of expenditure, but the sources of the funds which excited public
3
scrutiny.
The asserted need for such a fund presents basic questions concerning the locus of responsibility for maintaining the republican
system. The success of the representative principle 4 depends upon:
(1) free availability of public records and information-the electors
must be possessed of adequate and reliable information if they are
to effectively direct their representatives;5 (2) the right to petition,
which embraces the free and equal opportunity of each constituent
to communicate his ideas and opinions to his representative;6 (3) free
speech-the electors must enjoy full and complete opportunity to
discuss among themselves the problems of society.7 Necessarily, how1. Although all observers have referred to the expense account as a "trust" fund,
and there is no doubt that expenditures from the fund were made by a "trustee," no

statement has been made as to the precise purposes of the trust or whether it was
oral or written.
2. The funds were used for printing, mailing, radio and television time, meals for
constituents, and general publicizing of the Senator's activities. Senator Nixon received
an annual Congressional appropriation of approximately $50,000 for the administration
of his office; he asserted that, because of the size of his state and its great distance
from the Capitol, this appropriation was insufficient.
3. The propriety of the executive use of private funds for public purposes is
raised by the charge that Governor Adlai Stevenson of Illinois supplemented the salaries
of state administrative personnel by funds raised from private sources.
4. Representation is based upon population and territory. But as to the possibilities
of functional representation in the United States, see MAcDONALD, A NEW CONSTITUTION FOR A NEW AamucA 127-139 (1921).
5. "If the public opinion which directs conduct of governmental affairs is to have
any validity; if the people are to be capable of real self-rule, access to all relevant facts
upon which rational judgments may be based must be provided." Note, 27 IND. L.J.
209, 211 (1951).
6. See note 22 infra.
7. "We have in this country but one security. You may think that is the Constitution-it is nothing but a bit of paper. You may think the statutes are your
security-they are nothing but words in a book. You -may think that elaborate
mechanism of government is your security-it is nothing at all, unless you have sound
and uncorrupted public opinion to give life to your Constitution, to give vitality to your
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sever, the ultimate end will be frustrated if impartial representation
freedom from obligation to any elector or particular group of electorsis not assured. 9
The existence of highly organized lobbying groups coupled with
increasing governmental participation in social and economic activities 10 accentuates the need for positive action to secure the conditions
requisite to proper functioning of the representative system. Congressional power and ability to develop the above-mentioned modes of
communication, particularly those utilized by lobbies, poses questions of constitutional and political import. Efforts to maintain the
integrity of the representative system by compelling political candidates
and committees, as well as lobbying groups, to disclose their financial
sources and expenditures, while constituting an indispensable element
in any such endeavor, confront difficult problems of coverage and enforcement.

I
Evidence of the importance in keeping the people informed as
to the activities of Congress and its members is found in the constitutional mandate that Congress maintain and publish a journal of
its proceedings." However, information may be withheld from publication when the members, in their judgment, feel that secrecy is
necessary.'2 Thus, unlike the dual responsibility of the courts and
legislature in the free speech area,' 3 Congress has the sole power to
determine the extent to which the public shall be apprised of its activistatutes, to make efficient your governmental machinery." Charles Evans Hughes, while
campaigning against William Randolph Hearst for the governorship of New York.
1 PusEY, CHARLES EVANS HUGHES 175 (1951).
8. As a practical matter it should be recognized that despite the fact that representation is based on territory, to the extent that legislators are influenced by pressure
groups, a combination of functional and territorial represenation similar to the Soviet
representative system is derived. MEISEL AND KOZERA, MATERIALS FOR THE STUDY OF
Consequently, impartiality is to this degree
THE SOVIET SYSTEMa 106, 276 (1950).
illusory. The point here, however, is not that this extra-legal functional representation
is necessarily bad, but that such a situation should be disclosed.
9. Concerning the Nixon trust fund, Senator Clements of Kentucky said that if
use of such a fund received popular approval, it would ".

.

. establish a code of

ethics which will destroy representative democracy." Louisville Courier-Journal, Sept.
25, 1952, p. 1, col. 6.
10. "This has created a necessity for more extensive and better intercommunication
between it [government] and the public in the interests of both." 1 CHAFEE, GOVERNMENT AND MASS COMMUNICATIONS 13 (1947).
11. U.S. CoNsT. Axr. I, § 5.
12. Ibid.
13. See p. 89 infra:
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ties. 1 4 Congress has thus far discharged this responsibility adequately

by publication of the Congressional Record and of committee hearings
and reports. 15 Also, the public and press may and do attend nearly
all legislative sessions and committee hearings.'0 Despite this excellent
record, Congress has not yet fully recognized that proper utilization
of newer mass communication developments, such as radio and television, could enhance political education. Of course, when such coverage is allowed, a balanced presentation of all viewpoints rather than
7
one-sided sensationalism, should be required.'
Although justifiable limitations upon public scrutiny of congressional performance may arise where disclosure would impede national
14. U.S. CoNST. Art. I, § 5. Thirty-three of the states have provisions in their
constitutions relating to public ,sessions. 3 NEw YORK STATE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION COMMITTEE, CONSTITUTIONS OF THE STATES AND UNITED STATES 1785 (1938).
Twenty-eight of these allow for closed sessions when secrecy is required. Of these,
ten expressly vest in each house the power to determine the necessity for secrecy. Idaho
and New Mexico must keep all sessions open. Texas and Florida allow secret sessions
only for the Senate in executive session. Ohio requires a two-thirds vote of members
present to hold a secret session.
The importance attached to full disclosure of the legislators' discussion may be
measured by the constitutionally granted immunity from libel and slander actions for
statements made on the floor of the House and Senate. U.S. CONST. Art. I, § 6.
15. Most governmental publications, including congressional documents, reach very
few people. As a result, the main reliance for imparting information concerning
Congress is upon the press. Difficulties in obtaining adequate coverage of legislative
activities are manifold; yet these could possibly be mitigated by the existence of a
government-owned radio and television station which would operate for this purpose
only. An FCC requirement, as a condition of licensing radio and television stations,
that time be devoted to coverage of congressional activities would be another feasible
device. Utilization of such techniques poses many problems not within the scope of
this discussion.
16. The rules governing presence in the press and radio galleries are found in
the Congressional Directory. Admittance to these sections has been denied to those
directly or indirectly paid by groups having legislation before either house. CoNG. Di.,
80th Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1948).
The public and members of the press are admitted to all "open" committee sessions
and are excluded from executive sessions. Occasionally reporters will be permitted to
attend executive sessions, but this is unusual. Senate committees exercise broad discretion in this matter; each determines whether hearings are to be open or executive
and controls the extent of coverage by radio, press and television.
17. SEN. REs. 319, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. (1952), introduced by Senator McCarran,
provides for barring radio, television, photographs, and recording devices from all committee hearings. Such blanket prohibition contravenes the thesis that informing the
people about the operations of Congress is essential. However, some hearings may
require secrecy when the committee is performing a function similar to that of a grand
jury. 35 J. Am. JUD. Soc'y 131 (1952). Similar non-disclosure could be justified in
the case of committees dealing with foreign affairs and other matters concerning national
security. Speaker of the House Rayburn's ban on radio and television may have been
due to the decidedly inadequate coverage of certain congressional activities.
The dangers inherent in partial disclosure of facts presented to congressional
committees should not be underestimated. This was implicitly recognized by one
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security, "[p]erhaps it is an universal truth that loss of liberty at
home is to be charged to provisions against danger, real or potential,
from abroad."' 8 But despite probable continuance of the present world
crisis, fears of an autocratic government based upon secret deliberations should be tempered by the realization that severe pressure can
be applied by the electorate, should congressional resort to secrecy
become abusive. 19
In addition to congressional presentation to the public of its
record of collective action, the individual legislator must attempt to
communicate with his electors. Apparently Senator Nixon believed
that the public funds appropriated for his use were insufficient to
finance his imparting of information to which he felt his constituents
were entitled. That necessity for such communication is but one facet
of a more fundamental issue was illustrated by the concern of both
major political parties that the Senator's utilization of private support for any purpose had cast doubt upon the impartiality of his representative position.2 0 Even if Congress were to agree with Senator
Nixon's position that the present allowance for administering a congressman's office is insufficient, it should not be assumed that a mere
increase in appropriations available for use of public officials will fore21
close the possibility of undue influence engendered by private aid.
congressional committee, the Procurement and Buildings Subcommittee of the House
Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Department, in its rules of procedure,
which provided that "[t]he stenographic transcript of all testimony given in executive
session shall be available to the public upon any part thereof being made public by
the Subcommittee.... ." Quoted in CoEEN, MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS ON LEGISLATION
558 (1949). The rules further provided that "[n]o transcript of testimony under oath
given at a public hearing or in executive session shall be altered or edited." Ibid.
18. James Madison, writing to Thomas Jefferson in 1798. Quoted in LASSWELL,
NATIONAL SECURITY AND INDIvIDUAL FREDOIm 23 (1950).
19. For an excellent discussion of the problems of free communication facing
the country during the present crisis, see LASSWELL, op. cit. supra note 18 passim.
20. Congress has attempted to insure an impartial discharge of duty on the part
of federal appointive employees in the executive branch by forbidding them from
taking ... . any active part in political management or political campaigns." 18 U.S.C.
§ 61h (1946). The Supreme Court upheld the Hatch Act against constitutional attack
in United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1946).
21. Another evident method of undermining the impartiality of the legislative
position is through contributions to campaign funds. For a discussion of this problem
and suggested remedies see Douglas, What It Costs To Run, 190 At. Monthly, August,
1952, p. 43.
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II
Although the constitutionally preserved right to petition the government22 has been variously construed, 23 essentially it seems to embody the people's right to make public officials responsive to their
needs. 24 While responsiveness is largely achieved by public criticism
of governmental action and inaction, and by exercise of the franchise,
the main contemporary use of petition, i.e., the presentation of views
and problems before the particular branch of the government from
which relief is sought, is not without its effect. The Constitution did
not designate procedures to be followed in placing grievances before
Congress, perhaps because the Constitutional Convention did not anticipate difficulties in this area. In contrast to this, however, Congress
was given power to regulate the presentation of controversies to federal
22. The right to petition the government for redress of grievances is protected by
the United States Constitution and forty-four state constitutions. 3 NEW YORK STATE
CONSTITUTIONAL

CONVENTION

COMMITTEE,

CONSTITUTIONS OF THE STATES

AND UNITED

STATES 1792 (1938). The right originated with the presentation of petitions to the
King of England, generally for redress of private wrongs. POLLARD, EVOLUTION OF
PARLIAMENT 42 (1920). The petitions were then presented to the High Court of
Parliament and the King in his Council. By an ordinance of 1291, the practice was
systematized; receivers examined the petitions and separated them into five categories:
chancery; exchequer; the judges; the King and his Council; and those already answered.
Id. at 39. When petitions concerning the same grievance were received in the Council,
they were combined so as to attain added persuasiveness. It was at this time that
the parliament became a deliberative assembly rather than a judicial tribunal. Id. at 60.
In later years the petition became a means of presenting popular views to the
parliament. Petitions were circulated throughout the country for presentation to parliament by a large body of citizens. Although restrictions were placed upon the number
of signatures and the number of people permitted to present them, this method became
common in 1778, in connection with the controversy over the Roman Catholic Relief Act.
2. TAYLOR, ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF THE ENGLISH CONSTITUTION 499 (1900).
This method of influencing Congress has rarely been utilized in this country.
2 CHAFEE, GOVERNMENT AND MASS COMMUNICATIONS 783 (1947).
23. Vermont, North Carolina, and Pennsylvania have construed the right of petition
as one empowering the people to instruct their representatives. THORPE, CONSTITUTIONAL
HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE 56 (1898).
Spayd v. Ringing Rock Lodge, 270 Pa. 101, 113 Atl. 70 (1921), held that the right to
petition cannot be surrendered by the citizen and that a labor union cannot expel a
member for signing a petition to the legislature the subject of which conflicted with the
union's interest.
In Crandall v. Nevada, 6 Wall. 35 (U.S. 1868), the right to petition provision
was used to invalidate a Nevada tax upon people leaving the state since the levy
interfered with their right to go to Washington to petition the government.
The right to petition was also used by Justice Black as a basis for dissenting
from a decision sustaining the constitutionality of the application of a group libel law
to a defamatory petition. Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952).
24. "This [right to petition] would seem unnecessary to be expressly provided
for in a republican government since it results from the very nature of its structure
and institutions. It is impossible that it could be practically denied until the spirit of
Lberty had wholly disappeared and the people had become so servile and debased as to
be unfit to exercise any of the privileges of freemen." 2 STORY ON THE CONSTITUTION
§ 1894 (4th ed. 1873).
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courts in all cases except those in which the Supreme Court has original
jurisdiction.2 5 It is still undecided whether Congress may limit the
expression of opinion before it, and, if so, the extent permissible.
The general methods by which cases must be presented to the
federal courts, and the manner in which they should be considered,
has been well settled for many years, but solutions to analogous
situations with reference to the legislature are far from apparent.
Even if such procedures do become crystallized in the future, it will
be manifestly impossible for all citizens to present their views before
Congress; hence, communication with their representative is the natural
alternative. Official responsiveness to a constituent's demands certainly
must not, in a truly representative system, be gauged by whether or
not the particular elector has aided in the financing of the representative with whom he seeks an audience. 26 That there is even the
slightest possibility of such an occurrence is, of course, the basic objection to trust funds such as that used by Senator Nixon.2 7 While it
is not here contended that representatives would intentionally permit
their decisions to be weighted by such considerations, as Senator Douglas pointed out in his recent book :28 "What happens is a gradual shifting of a man's loyalties from the community to those who have been
doing him favors. His final decisions are, therefore, made in response
to his private friendships and loyalties, rather than to public good.
Throughout this whole process, the official will claim-and may indeed
believe-that there is no causal connection between the favors he has
secured and the decisions which he makes. He will assert that the
25. U.S. CoNsT. Art III, § 2.
26. Nevertheless, recent studies show that those persons who help finance a candidate's campaign wield an inordinate amount of influence. "[The] conclusion is
that the representative process as practised in twentieth-century America involves,
insofar as voting behavior is concerned, the attempt of the representative to mirror the
political desires of those groups which can bring about his election or defeat." TURNER,
See also Douglas,
PARTY AND CONSTITUENCY: PRESSURES ON CONGRESS 178 (1951).
supra note 21, at 44.
27. The following editorial comments were made the morning after the discussion
by Senator Nixon of his expense fund and personal finances. Washington Post: "The
central issue as we view it, remains unanswered by the Senator's talk. It is whether
any such private fund can be squared with our American ideals of representative government. In our opinion, it cannot." Washington Star: "Mhat Senator Nixon has said
in his defense does not remove the fact that use of an expense fund such as he had
rests on dubious ethical grounds." That opinion as to the moral implications of the
fund was not unanimous was indicated by the Syracuse (N.Y) Post Standard: "We
now feel, in light of the honest, clean-cut explanation, that the American people will
realize that there is nothing legally or morally wrong with Nixon's fund, and that
American fair play will forgive whatever error of judgment may have conveyed the
appearance, but not the substance, of wrong." All of these excerpts were published in
the New York Times, Sept 25, 1952, p. 28.
28. DOUGLAS, ETHICS IN GOvERNMENT (1952).
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favors were given and received on the basis of pure friendship, unsullied by worldly considerations. He will claim that the decisions, on
the other hand, will have been made on the basis of the justice and
equity of the particular case. The two series of acts will be alleged
to be as separate as the east is from the west. Moreover, the whole
process may be so subtle as not to be detected by the official himself. 2 9
Assuming that the representative system is not impaired, some
commentators assert that legislators should not be influenced by
the people's views, but must instead exercise their collective judgment
based upon an independent discovery of the facts. 30 Others argue
that the legislator should be constantly aware of public opinion and
reflect it accurately. While congressmen operate under both theories
at present, the ultimate choice between them is certainly a political
problem for the voter, depending upon which basis he uses for selecting
representatives.3 1
Essentially the people's opinions reach the legislature in two ways:
(1) directly, by presentation of views to Congress, its committee6,
and its members, 82 and (2) indirectly, by pressure group efforts to
29. Id. at 44.
30. MILL, REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 234 (1882). But see TURNER, op. Cit.
supra note 26, at 165: "The ideal of independence is often upheld by representatives in
their speeches, and perhaps in their unrecorded activities in government, but their
responsibility to the groups which can bring about their election is maintained in the
votes of the great majority of congressmen. The number of congressmen is very small
who over a large number of roll calls can successfully resist the pressure of constituency and party."
31. MILL, op. cit. supra note 30, at 234.
32. H.R. REP. No. 3138, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 23-8 (1950).
"..T.[The encyclopedia of lobbying practices needs frequent supplements to keep
it up to date.
"And they best be cumulative supplements; for while lobbying techniques are
continually being streamlined, the old standbys of pressure tactics are only slowly
relinquished. New methods are added but old ones are not dropped. For example,
direct contacting of legislators, the critical component of any traditional definition of
lobbying, is still a common practice. Individuals and groups very properly seek to
apprise legislators directly of their views on public issues. The variations on this old
practice are, of course, endless.
"Some groups make their views known by letters, telegrams, and phone calls. Others
depend largely on personal contact with Members of Congress, and still others think
they can best serve their cause by organizing delegations for marches on the Capitol.
"Members of Congress are used to being sought out in their offices, in their homes,
in the corridors of the office buildings and of the Capitol, in the cloakrooms and
restaurants, on the floor of the Chamber itself. They expect and welcome letters, telegrams, and telephone calls from constituents and those outside their districts as well.
In an age where the actions of Congress directly affect the lives of so many, leg'slators
depend upon these communications in a very real and immediate way. They are both
the pipelines and lifelines of our kind of representative government.
"But such statements and comments are not always as spontaneous, original, or
genuine as they appear." Id. at 23.
"The service function in lobbying takes many different forms. When representatives of organized groups appear before committees of Congress, for example, they
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use the influence of the constituency in order to shape the legislator's
attitudes. 33
To facilitate its understanding of the activity of those who make
direct contact with legislators and legislative committees, Congress, in
1946, passed the Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act 34 in conjunction with the Legislative Reorganization Act. Persons receiving contributions or spending money to influence directly or indirectly the passage
or defeat of legislation by Congress must file a quarterly report with the
Clerk of the House disclosing the identity of contributors of $500 or
more and also the name and address of each person to whom an expenditure of $10 or more was made. 35
The Lobbying Act requires registration, with the Clerk of the
House of Representatives and the Secretary of the Senate, by every
person who engages himself for pay or any consideration for the
purpose of attempting to influence legislation before Congress. Moreover, each registrant must file quarterly with both the Clerk and the
Secretary, the name of his employer, the interest he represents, his
salary and expenses, the legislation in which he has an interest, and
the names of newspapers and periodicals in which he has published
articles and editorials. Members of the press and public officials, when
acting in their principal occupation, need not register, nor must a
36
person who is merely appearing before a congressional committee.
Conviction for failure to comply results in a fine or a three year ban
37
upon that person's lobbying activities.
are not only presenting their own case but they are also providing Members of Congress
with one of the essential raw materials of legislative action." Id. at 27.
33. H.R. REP. No. 3138, supra note 32, at 28-43.
"Ever since President Wilson's first administration, however, the ever growing
army of pressure groups has recognized that the power of the government ultimately
rests on the power of public opinion. This simple discovery lies at the root of the
evolution of lobbying techniques since 1913. The extensive use of franked releases
antagonistic to the chief items of the Underwood tariff bill of that year was probably
the first large scale effort to bring public opinion to bear on legislation. In this sense,
the use of highly charged franked releases as an instrument of pressure was the bridge
between the old lobbying and the new. It opened the way to the development of entirely
new dimensions in the theory and practice of lobbying. Today, the long run objective
of every significant pressure group in the country is and must inevitably be the creation
and control of the public opinion; for without the support of an articulate public, the
most carefully planned direct lobbying is likely to be ineffective, except on small or
narrow issues." Id. at 29.
The many techniques utilized by those attempting to affect public opinion are vividly
presented in Hearings before House Select Committee on Lobbying Activities, (Pt. 8
Foundation for Economic Education) 81st Cong., 2d Sess. (1950).
34. 60 STAT. 839, 2 U.S.C. § 261 et seq. (1946).
35. Id. § 264.
36. Id. § 267.
37. A violation of the.Acts by a person, which includes an individual, partnership
or corporation, results in a fine or imprisonment or both. The Act also provides: "(b)
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The specific constitutional issue raised by the Act is whether Congress can thus regulate the manner in which information is presented
to it. Since the committee system is created solely through congressional initiative for the purpose of discovering certain facts and
opinions and preparing legislative proposals, restrictions upon appearance before a committee are clearly within congressional power, 38 but
regulation of procedures by which ideas may be communicated to
individual congressmen presents a more difficult question. Arguably
the Act's limitations, especially the three year ban on lobbying activities, restrict the freedom of speech of both those who wish to espouse
their views and the individual legislator. Past judicial experience,
i.e., the standards embodied in Supreme Court decisions, has been
confined to the problems of communication among the people. Pragmatically, whether the Court should apply the same standards to
congressional regulation of procedures for direct presentation of views
to Congress and its members depends upon the necessity for free and
unregulated communication in this area. Yet determination of the need
for, and the type of, supervision ought to be left to the legislature rather
than to the courts, since legislators possess a unique knowledge of the
problems confronting them. Congressional recognition of the same
principle with regard to the judiciary is evidenced by its delegation
of authority to the Supreme Court to promulgate rules of procedure
for federal courts. Therefore, regulation in this area, because of its
significant effect upon efficacious operation of the legislature, should
be, like congressional dissemination of information to the people, solely
a legislative responsibility. This suggestion merely recognizes, in effect,
that legislators will be under constant political pressure to devise the
best methods of gathering informatiori, for it is the legislation based
upon this data by which they will be judged on election day. Although
the Supreme Court may intervene if congressional regulation is tantamount to complete prohibition, or becomes obnoxious to the public
interest by according special interests undue advantage, it should otherwise defer to legislative determination of the necessary supervision.
Future legislation limiting those who may represent particular
interests as lobbyists, and governing the place where presentation of
In addition to the penalties provided in subsection (a) of this section, any person convicted of the misdemeanor specified therein is prohibited for a period of three years
from the date of such conviction, from attempting to influence, directly or indirectly.
the passage or defeat of any proposed legislation or from appearing before the committees of the Congress in support or opposition to proposed legislation .. " Id. § 269.
38. "Each house must also be allowed to proceed in its own way in the collection
of such information as may seem important to a proper discharge of its functions .. .

1

COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS

275 (8th ed. 1927).

NOTES
views may be effected, will encounter difficult enforcement problems,
since contacts are often made through normal social relationships. It
should be recognized, however, that the tightest surveillance of lobbying
activities coupled with the most stringent enforcement sanctions will
be of little real effect unless the conduct of the representatives themselves satisfies the highest ethical standards. As a possible aid in the
furtherance of effective regulation of the channels of direct communication to Congress, the lobbyist should be placed on a professional level
comparable to members of the bar, with immediate responsibility for
self-policing but with remote supervision by the legislature and the
39

courts.

III
Lobbyists attempt to influence Congress indirectly by conveying
their ideas to the people in the hope that they will adopt them and
attempt to mold their legislator's attitude through letter-writing campaigns, personal contacts, and threatened withdrawal of electoral support.40 In addition to lobbies such as trade associations and unions,
which maintain persbnal contact with congressmen and congressional
committees, the so-called "research institute" endeavors to affect legislation by disseminating its social and economic philosophy among the
electorate. 41 These groups make known their attitudes on current
issues and political events mainly by distributing literature to: (1)
interested persons who subscribe to their materials regularly ;42 (2) persons who order in quantity for redistribution ;43 (3) newspapers and
other periodicals for republication and as a basis for articles and editorials ;44 and (4) persons whose names appear on purchased mailing
lists. 45

39. In other words a legislative bar. See 1 SUTHERLAND,

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION

§ 1224 (3d ed., Horack, 1943).

40. See note 33 supra.
41. H.R. REm. supra note 32, at 31-6; Hearings, supra note 33 (Pt. 5 Committee
For Constitutional Government; Pt. 8 Foundation for Economic Education).
42. H. R. REP. supra note 32, at 35.

43. Ibid.
44. "Mr. Doyle. One other question: I noticed, in many California papers, what
I would call standard editorials, of exactly the same text. In your processes, do you
send out stereotyped editorials?
"Mr. Rumley: No; we do not send out canned editorials. We send out informative information which we hope the papers will print. In a fight like this one, we
picked out about 20 editorials that told our side, and sent them to all newspapers in
the United States." Hearings, supra note 33 (Pt. 5 Committee for Constitutional
Government 117). See also, H.R. REP. supra note 32, at 37-9.

45. Id. at 35.
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In addition to other disclosure provisions of the Lobbying Act,
lobbies which receive contributions for the "principal purpose" of
directly or indirectly influencing legislation before Congress, must
reveal the names of all persons who contribute $500 or more and must
furnish detailed accounts of all expenditures exceeding $10.46 The
organization must also keep the accounts necessary to furnish accurate
reports. 47 In a suit brought to test the constitutionality of these provisions and to determine their applicability to its group, the National
Association of Manufacturers contended that the registration and disclosure requirements violated freedom of speech. The district court held
Sections 303-307 unconstitutional on two grounds: vagueness and violation of the First Amendment. The court found that as applied to N.A.M.
the phrases "principal purpose" and "to influence directly and indirectly
the passage or defeat of any legislation by the Congress" were too indefinite to constitute an ascertainable standard of guilt.4 s It also held that the
penalty provision, which would ban lobbying activity for three years,
deprives persons of constitutional rights under the First Amendment. 49
Discourse between persons and groups traditionally has been protected by the constitutional guarantees accorded speech, press, and
assembly.50 Yet the courts have permitted exceptions to the seemingly
46. 60 STAT. 840, 2 U.S.C. § 264 (1946).
47. Id. § 262.
48. In United States v. Slaughter, 89 F. Supp. 205 (D. D.C. 1950), Judge Schweinhaut, who also participated in the N.A.M. case, held that "the phrase 'for the purpose
of attempting to influence' is understandable in common parlance and susceptible of proof
in a given case" and therefore was not too vague and uncertain as applied to a person's
legislative representative. Judge Holtzoff, who wrote the court's opinion in the N.A.M.
case, later ruled that defendant Slaughter's activities came within the provision excepting from the Act's requirements those who appear before congressional committees.
89 F.Supp. 876 (D. D.C. 1950).
49. National, Association of Manufacturers v. McGrath, 103 F. Supp. 510 (D. D.C.
1952). An appeal was filed in the Supreme Court, No. 174, but the Solicitor General
on July 3, 1952. Contentions: 1) the Act is not unconstitutional because of vagueness
or violation of the First Amendment; 2) the district court erred in deciding constitutional
questions before deciding the applicability of the Act to N.A.M.; 3) the proceeding was
moot or abated when the decision was made since Attorney General McGrath had
resigned. 21 U.S.L. Week 3049 (U.S. Aug. 12, 1952). The Supreme Court agreed with
the latter argument in granting the motion to vacate. 72 Sup. Ct. 31 (1952).
50. "Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press. . . ." U.S. CoNsT. AmEND. I. Previous to the adoption of the First Amendment, the protection of freedom of speech was applied only to previous restraints.
4 BL. CoMm. *151. Cooley's comment on Blackstone repudiated the doctrine of prior
restraints as being an ineffective protection. He described the purpose of the free
speech clauses to be ". . . to protect parties in the free publication of matters of public
concern, to secure their right to a free discussion of public events and public measures,
and to enable every citizen at any time to bring the government and any person in
authority to the bar of public opinion by any just criticism upon their conduct in the
exercise of the authority which the people have conferred upon them." 2 COOLEY,
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absolute safeguards embodied in the First. Amendment when Congress
has found a substantive evil which it has a right to prevent. Hdwever, the measure thus adopted must outweigh the public interest in
free communication and must be no more restrictive than is reasonably
and clearly necessary to prevent the particular evil. 5 1 Certainly the
sanction provided by the Regulation of Lobbying Act, prohibition of
lobbying for three years, meets these criteria since prohibiting the
presentation of a certain point of view by the offending group, while
at the same time other groups remain free to present that same view,
is the only effective means of meeting a problem which could conceivably endanger the sanctity of the free representative system. Although the Supreme Court has invalidated legislation abridging free
speech, congressional action to encourage and strengthen the philosophy
permeating the First Amendment certainly ought to be possible.5 2
At present, neither adequate source material, such as cases or
writings, or actual experience exists to guide Congress in initiating,
and the courts in reviewing, affirmative action to foster the development of sound public opinion.

3

Conceivably, the compulsory dis-

closure provisions of the Lobbying Act could tend to stifle dissemination
LIMITATIoNs 885 (8th ed. 1926); cf. CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH IN THE
UNITED STATES 1-35 (1941).
"Congress shall make no law . . . abridging . . . the right of the people peaceably to assemble. . . ." U.S. CONST. AMEND. I. As to the development of this right,
see Jarrett and Mund, The Right of Assembly, 9 N.Y.U.L.Q. REv. 1 (1931). See also
Hague v. C.I.O., 307 U.S. 496 (1939).
51. Dennis v. United States, 340 U.S. 821 (1951); American Communications
Association v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950) ; Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1946).
See also CHAFEE, FREE SPEEcH IN THE UNITE STATES (1941) passrim.
52. "Speech should be fruitful as well as free. Our experience introduces this
qualification into the classical argument of Milton and John Stuart Mill, that only
through open discussion is truth discovered and spread. In their simpler times they
thought it enough to remove legal obstacles like censorship and sedition prosecutions.
Mill assumed that if men were only left alone, their reasoning power would eventually
impel them to choose the best ideas and the wisest course of action. To us this policy
is too exclusively negative. For example, what is the use of telling an unpopular speaker
that he will incur no criminal penalties by his proposed address, so long as every hall
owner in the city declines to rent him space for his meeting and there are no vacant
lots available...
"We must do more than remove discouragements to open discussion. We must
exert ourselves to supply active encouragements.
"Physical space and lack of interference will not make discussion fruitful. We
must take affirmative steps to improve the methods by which discussion is carried on."
CHAFEE, op. cit. supra note 51, at 599.
53. "We can speak with much less assurance about affirmative governmental
action than was possible in dealing with governmental restrictions. Here we have no
abundant material to guide us, either in judicial decisions or in writers like Milton and
Mill." 2 CHAFEE, GOVERNMENT AND MASS COMMUNICATIONS 473 (1947). Compulsory
disclosure of recipients of second class postal rates on periodicals has worked well.
This has been true because officials are energetic when revenue is at stake. Id. at 492.
CONSTITUTIONAL
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of ideas. Individuals and corporations might refrain from contributing
to a particular organization if to do so would result in criticism generated by widespread dislike of the group's activities and opinions.
And a decline in monetary receipts would undeniably diminish the
organization's effectiveness. But the essential basis for any such consequence is not the Lobbying Act. The Act merely makes possible the
effective marshalling of public opinion ;54 if this results in censure of
the contributor's support, it will be because of the public's distaste
for the group's program coupled with a failure to perceive the benefits
to widespread political education by such dissemination.
Congress having enacted limited disclosure provisions, the groups
affected thereby should not assume that their role is the negative one
of circumventing revelation. Rather, their efforts should be directed
to initiating and maintaining a positive program geared to overcome
the Act's feared consequences by encouraging wider public acceptance
of their views. If the latter approach proves successful, it would then
be evident that the Act did not serve to restrict, but rather encouraged,
the communication of ideas. In addition to furnishing the public more
information upon which to base its political, economic and social judgments, such disclosure should enlighten the people as to the role of
lobbies in a democratic society. Furthermore, the House Committee
hearings on the effectiveness of the Act failed to indicate that it deterred
contributions.55
Even if one concedes that the Act alone is liable to deter free
expression to some extent, courts should recognize its potential benefits
and permit legislative experimentation so that a sound policy of compulsory disclosure may be evolved. Since under the present Act, only
major contributions and expenditures need be revealed, no tenable
objection may be made that the expense of compiling the necessary
data is so great as to materially hinder operations.
54. "Mr. Lanham. It means something to me to know who is financing this
organization, just as it meant something to me to learn about Mr. Anderson's organization

(i.e., the Public Affairs Institute). I know that his organization, Mr. Anderson's,

will be slanted toward labor unions. I know that this organization, Mr. Read's organization, is supported by big corporations and no labor unions, and I know what to expect
in their literature. I may agree with part of it and I may disagree. However, I think
that the public ought to be able to tell, when the organizations mail out this stuff,
who is financing it." Hearings, supra note 33, at 119. See also H.R. REP., supra

note 32, at 15.
55. Hearings, supra note 33, Pts. 1-9.
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The Lobbying Act requires disclosure of all income and expenditures,
excepting those covered by the Corrupt Practices Act, by all persons who
receive money or anything of value, and whose principal purpose is "to
influence directly or indirectly, the passage or defeat of any legislation by
the Congress of the United States." Mere recognition of the necessity for
such publicity cannot assure realization of the Act's purposes; the
Act's effectiveness will be severely limited if the courts narrowly interpret the "principal purpose" requirement of Section 307.56 If the words
are construed to mean the major purpose, many organizations which
expend large amounts to influence legislation will not be covered since
their major purpose is to conduct trade activities."T If the Act is to
attain the end it purports to seek, courts must realize that a group may
have several major purposes.58 The Act would then cover groups
which make continuous efforts to influence legislation and which
receive large contributions to aid the accomplishment of this aim.
Should the broader construction be adopted, the question of
whether a group is carrying on the requisite activity will be one of
fact. The proposed interpretation of "principal purpose" is sufficiently
definite to require disclosure by those organizations which receive financial assistance either to maintain direct communication with congressmen or to indirectly influence Congress.5 9
56. "The provisions of this chapter shall apply to any person except a political
committee as defined in the Federal Corrupt Practices Act, and duly organized State
or local committees of a political party, who by himself, or through any agent or
employee or other persons in any manner whatsoever, directly or indirectly, solicits,
collects, or receives money or any other thing of value to be used principally to
aid, or the principal purpose of which person is to aid, in the accomplishment of any
of the following purposes:
"(a) The passage or defeat of any legislation by the Congress of the United States.
"(b) To influence, directly or indirectly, the passage or defeat of any legislation
by the Congress of the United States." 60 STAT. 841, 2 U.S.C. § 266 (1946) (emphasis
added)
57. Section 305 of the Act conflicts with section 307, note 56 supra, in that

§ 305 requires that all persons who influence legislation report contributions and expenditures while § 307 says the Act is only applicable to those whose principal purpose
is to influence legislation. However, it would seem that § 307 controls, since it is the
coverage section and since the purpose of the Act was not to cover those who only
incidentally influence legislation. SEN. RFP. No. 1400, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 27 (1946).
N.A.M. contended in its injunction suit that principal purpose meant majority purpose.
Plaintiff's Trial Brief, pp. 90-102; Plaintiff's Reply Brief, pp. 58-69.
58. The government contended that "principal purpose" means "substantial and not
incidental purpose." Defendant's Trial Brief, pp. 82-106.
59. The District Court opinion on the constitutionality of Lobbying Act § 303-307
rested partially on the vagueness in the meaning of "to influence, directly or indirectly,
the passage or defeat of legislation. . .

."

In so doing the Court ignored familiar

cases in which the nebulous concepts of "reasonable" and "unreasonable" were found
to be sufficiently certain to avoid constitutional infirmity. United States v. Ragen, 314

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
The Lobbying Act expressly exempts practices and activities regulated by the Federal Corrupt Practices Act. 60 Although the Lobbying
Act concerns legislation and the Corrupt Practices Act emphasizes
election, the distinction is unrealistic since both purport to regulate
methods of indirectly influencing legislation. Organizations which indirectly influence legislation may also attempt to affect elections even
though their utterances concern issues rather than candidates. If the
difference between the Acts is based upon direction of the group's
activities, i.e., toward legislation or toward elections, during a particular
period of time, then the distinction is indefinite and an organization
may be required to file under both Acts to avoid violations. For instance, suppose a group initiates a campaign against the Taft-Hartley
Act more than one year before an election in which a senator taking
the opposite view is up for re-election. If the attack on the legislation
is maintained with the same intensity, or perhaps even increased, under
which Act is it to file?
During the course of House Committee Hearings concerning lobbying activities, it was indicated that the Lobbying Act's meaning is
unclear even to some members of Congress.0 ' However, Congress
seemingly intended that the long-term general purpose of the donee
organization-rather than the specific activity engaged in at the time
the donation is made-should be the prime determinant. For example,
if a group's activities are not solely directed toward support of political
candidates and it accepts contributions for its entire program it would
U.S. 513 (1941); United States v. Shreveport Grain & Elev. Co., 287 U.S. 77 (1932).

See also United States v. Petrillo, 332 U.S. 1 (1947) ; Jaffee v. Cruttenden, 107 N.E.
2d 715 (Ill. 1952).
Moreover, the court refused to place the words in the context of the long history
of lobbying techniques and also failed to take cognizance of congressional determination
of techniques utilized by lobbyists to influence the passage or defeat of legislation.
H.R. REP., supra note 32. Of the four types of activity which the court thought "may"
be included in the disputed words, three were clearly set out in the passages quoted
in notes 32 and 33 supra. The fourth type is admittedly included also. See Hearings,
supra note 33. "In proper cases, such [congressional] reports are given consideration
in determining the meaning of a statute, but only when that meaning is doubtful."
United States v. Shreveport Grain & Elev. Co., supra at 83. Certainly it is a surprise to
discover that, 40 years after the "new" lobbying techniques were evolved, a lobbyist may
not know when he is attempting to indirectly influence legislation.
Apt comment upon the status of the present Lobbying Act came during the Hearings on its effectiveness:
"Mr. Albert. [To Mr. Read, President of Foundation for Economic Education!.
However, I do feel sure that unless organizations as effective as yours in influencing
legislation can be covered by a lobbying act, that the Lobbying Act is not worth the
paper it is written on." Hearings, supra note 33, at 112.
60. 36 STAT. 823 (1910), as amended, 2 U.S.C. §244 (1946).
61. Hearings, supra note 33, at 26. (Pt. 6 Americans for Democratic Action).
For numerous definitions of the term "lobbying" see 96 CoNG. REc. 9028 (1950).
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be governed by the Lobbying Act. Thus, the Lobbying Act covers
organizations which indirectly affect legislation by all methods, including the influencing of elections. On the other hand, the Corrupt Practices Act is aimed at groups which accept contributions solely to influence elections.

62

Superficially, this dichotomy supplies sufficient criteria to enable
an affected group to register and disclose under the proper Act. But
closer investigation reveals the difficulties caused by the diversified
activities of various organizations. If the original donee merely serves
as a conduit between the donor and the ultimate recipient, which may be
63
either another lobby or a political committee, two basic questions arise.
First, under which Act should the initial donee disclose? In
case the donee recontributes funds to a political committee, it is
arguable that the original contribution was made solely to influence
an election; therefore, the donation should be reported under the Corrupt Practices Act. On the other hand, as is signified by the suggested
broad coverage of the Lobbying Act, use of this procedure could be
construed as merely another means by which the lobby can in62. Only one organization whose principal purpose is to influence legislation,
Americans for Democratic Action, has registered under the Corrupt Practices Act as
well as having its legislative representatives register under the Lobbying Act. Under
the above analysis, the ADA should register and disclose solely under the Lobbying
Act; nevertheless, this specific example proves the validity of the distinction between
the two Acts.
The following passage from the Hearing indicates the identification of lobbying
activity with political activity.
"Mr. Halleck. Apparently they [ADA] have certain legislative objectives they
want to achieve, if I understand it correctly; and that is the principal reason for the
existence of ADA.
"Now, by their own construction they have placed themselves principally in th:s
category of political activities rather than lobbying activities. I would assume from that
that ADA has concluded the most effective lobbying is to get out and engage in politics
out in the country, and so they treat themselves primarily as a political committee,
and then engage in, I would assume, the formation of public opinion back home that
would be calculated to persuade political judgment.
"In other words, I think it is quite clear that so far as ADA is concerned your
lobbying technique is principally a political technique.
"You figure that that is the best way to either bring about the adoption of legislation in Washington or to defeat it. Is that a fair statement, Mr. Biddle?
"Mr. Biddle [Former Attorney General of the United States appearing as National
Chairman of ADA]. I think that is a fair statement." Hearings, supra note 33,
Pt. 6 at 27.
63. This is undoubtedly a common method of avoiding the necessity of disclosing
identity of contributors. Such evasion would be particularly fruitful for labor organizations and corporations which are prohibited by the Corrupt Practices Act from contributing to influence an election. It is also unlawful for any person to accept or receive
such prohibited contributions. 43 STAT. 1074 (1925), as amended, 57 STAT. 167 (1943),
2 U.S.C. § 251 (1946).
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directly influence legislation. The only conclusion which can be safely
drawn from this perplexing situation is that the coverage and disclosure
provisions of the Acts must be recast to conform to the actualities of
64
present-day lobbying techniques.
The second question is whether the group, be it a lobby or a
political committee, which finally receives the contribution need disclose only the conduit organization, or the original donor, or both.
Obviously, if the organization knows the identity of the primary source,
it should be required to report it, as well as that of the ostensible donor.
Proper effectuation of the Acts makes it imperative that the burden of
proving the identity of the actual contributor be placed upon the group
whose report is challenged.
A similar problem is also raised where one, instead of contributing directly to thb lobbying group, pays the costs of printing literature
which is distributed either by, or for the lobby. Inasmuch as the Lobbying Act defines contributions to include "anything of value," that the
donation is not received directly by the organization is irrelevantreporting of such contributions is required. Absence of an enforcement agency to deal solely with this problem area, however, is a great
obstacle to effective implementation of the Act's objectives.
Other obvious methods are used to circumvent the requirement
that all contributions of $500 or more be reported. Some groups now
only accept donations of $499 or less. 65 The $500 limitation seems both
arbitrary and unrealistic. Almost insurmountable enforcement problems can be best overcome by requiring disclosure of all contributions
irrespective of amount. 66
The present Act does not specifically require reporting of income
received from corporations which "buy" large quantities of literature
for redistribution. 67 Certainly this should be included since more
64.

In the House Committee hearings, Rep. Halleck asked whether ADA chapters

participated in political activity at the local level and was answered by James Loeb,
then National Executive Secretary of ADA: "They do, and we very much encourage
them to do so."

"Mr. Halleck. You see, there have been suggestions that maybe that is the most
effective type of lobbying that one can imagine." Hearings, supra note 33, Pt. 6 at 13.
65. H.R. REP., supra note 32, at 12.
66. "Totalitarians, both of the left and of the right, attack democracy as a farce
and fraud where special interests govern. It is perhaps unrealistic to expect successful
candidates not to feel a certain responsibility to their financial angels. But we can at
least demand a full disclosure of who-and how angelic-they are. I am therefore
unequivocably for requiring publication of all campaign contributions right down to the
last dollar. This would include not only donations to candidates, but also those to all
participating committees."
Humphrey, Ethical Standards in American Legislative

Chambers, 280 ANNALS 53 (1952).
67. H.R. RE'., supra note 32, at 12.

NOTES
assistance may be rendered by assuming the task of distributing the
information, than is received from those who merely donate. Furthermore, the disclosure objective of the Act might be better achieved if
future legislation required that major contributors be listed on materials
distributed. 8
V
Preservation of the legislators' impartiality and integrity, a problem which goes to the very essence of representative government, is
most inadequately assured by both the Lobbying and the Corrupt Practices Acts as the Nixon affair so vividly demonstrates. If the American
ideal, a government responsive to the will of all the people, is to be
fully realized, the identity of all who contribute financial aid in whatever form in order to influence legislation must be revealed. That the
issue has been sharply focused in the heat of political battle, should
not obscure the basic fact that preservation of an impartial representative system transcends partisan politics. Congressional efforts in
this vital area having proven unsuccessful thus far, it is clear that the
gravity of the situation makes it imperative that a dispassionate Congress conduct a comprehensive study of the entire problem. The issue
may defy perfect solution, but congressional failure to meet this serious
challenge to the integrity of the representative mode of government
cannot be considered less than a breach of public trust, which could
certainly lessen the people's confidence in their chosen form of government.

STOP PAYMENT AND THE UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE
An Associated Press news dispatch of June 23, 1952 reported a
statement by the President of the American Bankers Association that
"there are now over 40 million checking accounts of individuals and
businesses, 30 million more than 10 years ago. And twice as many
68. Mr. Francis Biddle commented on the advisability of disclosure: "If an
organization definitely trying, definitely engaged in lobbying activities, if you want,
educational lobbying activities buys a very large number [of materials] to distribute
then I think the people ought to know about it. I do not think it is a matter of publishers selling their own books, but if an organization of a particular kind buys an
immense number of books for a particular effort to further certain ideas that it has been
putting out, which comes under the broad scope of lobbying.... I think that it is a
significant effect of education for the American people to know about." Hearings,
supra note 33, Pt. 6 at 53.
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checks were written in 1951 as in 1941. This tremendous volume has
prompted the [Bankers] association tojoin with representatives of the
Association of Reserve City Bankers and the Federal Reserve System
in a study aimed at improving the speed and efficiency of the nation's
check collection system."'- The report might well have contained a
comment on the fact that the check collection system faces a possible
legal overhauling which may vitally effect its "speed and efficiency."
For a number of years the Commission on Uniform Laws has
labored upon a Uniform Commercial Code, Article Four of which
deals with bank deposits and collections. Now ready for legislative
action, Article Four represents the proposed model solution to check
collection problems. 2 Although the stop payment order is but one facet
of Article Four, it depicts the depositor-bank relationship in action;
it poses important problems which pervade the check collection process.
That stop payment is of no minor concern in-bank administration becomes apparent when it is considered that one bank which daily
handles an average of 26,000 checks drawn on it receives stop payment orders on approximately 50 checks.a
Basic to an understanding of the Code's probable impact in this
troublesome area is a knowledge of prior developments in legal recognition and control of stop payment orders. Originally, under the common law, the depositor's right to stop payment was absolute, provided,
4
of course, that the stop order was duly received by the drawee bank.
While the origin of this right is much in doubt, 5 the result of a bank
paying over a stop order was certain. In the ordinary case, the bank
1.

Louisville Courier-Journal, June 24, 1952, § 2, p. 7, col. 5.

2. Unless otherwise specified, all references to the UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
(UCC) are to the Text and Comments Edition, 1952.
3. Information received from Mr. Freihage, Cashier of the Fletcher Trust Company, Indianapolis, Indiana. The number of checks received in a single day by banks
throughout the country ranges from 700 to 340,000. Leary, Deferred Posting And
Delayed Returns-The Current Check Collection Problem, 62 HARv. L. REV. 905, 908
(1949).
4. Horner, The Stop Payment Order, 2 BAYLOR L. REV. 275, 286 (1950). "Duly
received" means that the bank received the stop order in ample time to put it into effect.
Ibid.
5. Rationalization of the absolute right to stop payment has been found: (1) in the
doctrine of Price v. Neal, 3 Burr. 1355, 97 Eng. Rep. 871 (K.B. 1762), that the drawee
bank is really in the best position to know and control the exact disposition of a
depositor's account; see also

HANDBOOK

OF THE NATIONAL

CONFERENCE OF

COMMIS-

160, 173 (1934); (2) in a supposed contract implied at law as arising at the inception of the depositor-bank relationship, Viets v.
Union National Bank of Troy, 101 N.Y. 563, 5 N.E. 457, 54 Am. Rep. 743 (1886); 6
ZOLLMAN, BANKS AND BANKING 74 (1936) ; (3) in another contract application which
held that a check is an offer by the depositor to borrow money with an implied promise
to repay, and that therefore it is revocable any time prior to payment (acceptance) by
the bank. SPAHR, THE CLEARING AND COLLECTION OF CHECKS 3 (1926).
SIONERS ON UNIFORM

STATE LAWS
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could neither charge the drawer's account nor recover the amount paid. 6
With the increasing volume of checks, which aggravated the administrative problems and multiplied the liabilities incident to stop orders,
came inroads upon this depositor prerogative. A few state courts in
early decisions treated a check as an equitable assignment, 7 thereby
abrogating the stop payment right and its attendant problems.
Adoption of the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law, however,
terminated the short-lived equitable assignment theory,8 and reinstated
the common law rule.9
The courts then initiated other means of mitigating the bank's
strict liability for payment over a stop order. Thus, if the drawer would
otherwise be unjustly enriched, e.g., where he received full value for
his check, the bank was permitted to charge his account. 10 Where unauthorized payment was made to a holder in due course, the drawee
bank was subrogated to the holder's rights against the drawer and, as
in the equitable purchaser theory, it, therefore, had the right to charge
the drawer's account." Also, where the drawer had been induced by
fraud or misrepresentation to give his check to the payee, the bank
2
was subrogated to the rights of the drawer as. against the payee.'
These theories and the relief which they gave to banks, however, applied
to the exceptional rather than to the usual situation leading to use of
a stop order, e.g., when the check in question had been lost. The banks,
6. "I presume that no one at this day questions the right of the drawer of a
check to stop payment thereof. This is usually done by notice to the bank upon which
the check is drawn. If the bank pays after such notice, it does so at its peril." German
National Bank v. Farmer's Deposit Bank, 118 Pa. 294, 313, 12 At. 303, 305 (1888);
For this reason the drafters of the UNIFORM BANK
PATON'S DIGEST 1f1353 (1929).
COLLECTION ACT adopted the assignment theory for checks. HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL
CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS 262 (1929).
7. ". . . a check on a bank operates as an assignment pro tanto of the drawer's
deposit account or fund in bank. . . . It must follow that the drawer of a check cannot countermand its payment if the check has passed into the hands of a bona fide
holder." Loans and Savings Bank v. Farmer and Merchants Bank, 74 S.C. 210, 219,
220, 54 S.E. 364, 368 (1906); accord, Pease v. Landauer, 63 Wis. 20, 22 N.W. 847,
53 Am. Rep. 247 (1885); Union National Bank v. Oceana County Bank, 80 Ill. 212,
22 Am. Rep. 185 (1875). See Moore, Sessman, and Brand, Legal and Institutional
Methods Applied to 'Stop Paympent of Checks, 42 YALE L. REv. 817, 823 (1933).
8. "A check of itself does not operate as an assignment of any part of the funds
to the credit of the drawer with the bank, and the bank is not liable to the holder,
unless and until it accepts or certifies the check." NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW § 189.
9. BRANNAN, NEGOTIABLE INSTRUmENTS LAW 1316 (7th ed., Beutel, 1948).
10. PATON'S DIGEST ff 4519 (1926).
11. Where the drawer ordered his bank to stop payment, but the bank did honor
the check, which was presented by a holder in due course, "its authority to pay having
been revoked, the money given for the check, while in the form of a payment as agent
of the drawer, would not in fact have been so given, but rather an advance of its
[bank's] own money as purchaser of the rights of the holder, with right to set off
against the drawer's accounts." Id. at 4520 and 4520(a).
12. Id. at 4522-4523.
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therefore, turning to what amounted to a method of self-help, devised
release provisions to implement these judicially developed measures of
relief.
These release provisions or stipulations against liability are usually
incorporated in the stop order blank provided by the bank rather than
in the initial deposit agreement. Subtly characterized as an "agreement" between the bank and the depositor, it purports to discharge the
bank from liability for negligently, mistakenly, or inadvertantly paying, over the stop order. 1 3 Most of the stop order litigation has been
prompted by the use of these provisions.
With few exceptions, those courts which have faced the issue
squarely on contract principles have held that the release in the stop
order failed for want of consideration. 1 4 The theory advanced has
been that the right to stop payment was included in a contract implied
by law at the inception of the bank-depositor relationship, and that no
new benefit to the depositor or detriment to the bank supported the
promise to absolve the bank of liability. 15 The majority of tribunals,
however, have considered the release issue as one which transcends
basic contract principles. They have interpreted the bank's obligation
to stop payment as a duty imposed by public policy-somewhat analogous to duties imposed upon common carriers and utilities due to their
peculiar relationship with the public. These courts have invalidated
releases in toto, characterizing them as contrary to public policy.' 6 Most
13.

A typical stop order form with a release provision follows: "Please Endeavor

to Stop Payment of Check No. for

$-,

dated -

19-

drawn by the undersigned in favor of-

for the following reason

. It is expressly agreed

solely in conthat this request is made by the undersigned and accepted by
sideration that the undersigned hereby agrees to save said Company harmless and
indemnify it against all losses, cost and expense on account of any refusal to pay
said check, and shall not hold said Company liable if through the negligence, mistake,
or inadvertence of any of its officers or employees the check is paid contrary to this
request ...

"

Stop order form used by the Fletcher Trust Company, Indianapolis,

Indiana.
14. Reinhardt v. Passaic-Clifton National Bank and Trust Company, 16 N.J. Super.
430, 84 A.2d 741 (App. Div. 1951) ; Calmita v. Tradesmen's National Bank, 135 Conn.
326, 64 A.2d 46 (1949) ; Speroff v. First Cent. Trust Company, 149 Ohio 415, 79 N.E.2d
119 (1948). Contra: Hodnick v. Fidelity Trust Co., 96 Ind. App. 342, 183 N.E. 488
(1933) ; Gaita v. Windsor Bank, 251 N.Y. 152, 167 N.E. 203 (1929).
15. See Speroff v. First Cent. Trust Co., 149 Ohio 415, 79 N.E.2d 119 (1948).
16. Thomas v. First National Bank of Scranton, 20 U.S.L. WFEK 2370 (Pa.
C.P., Feb. 26, 1952) ("A purported release holding the bank blameless even though it
fails to exercise reasonable care and pays the check through its own negligence is
against public policy."); Cortillion Fabrics Corp. v. National Safety Bank and Trust
Co. of New York, 275 App. Div. 85, 87 N.Y.S.2d 343 (1st Dep't. 1948); Chase National Bank v. Battat, 297 N.Y. 185, 78 N.E.2d 465 (1948) ; Carroll v. South Carolina
National Bank, 211 S.C. 406, 45 S.E.2d 729 (1948); Elder v. Franklin National Bank,
25 Misc. 716, 55 N.Y.Supp. 576 (Sup. Ct. 1899) (This decision drew the first direct
analogy between the stop payment situation and that of common carriers).
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decisions have not distinguished the bank's attempted absolution for
negligent conduct from exculpation for paying over a stop order where
due care has been exercised. But some recent cases have made this
distinction, implying that a release may be valid to the extent that it
does not disclaim liability for negligence or willful disregard of the
stop order. 17 If the depositor has signed a release agreement, and the
bank can prove good faith and the exercise of due care, then this
*..

constitutes a valid defense to an action by the depositor to

recover the amount of the check." 18
It is important to note that these cases offer no guidance as to
what constitutes "due care" in attempting to stop payment. Thus,
the pertinent inquiry under this approach is not as to the validity of a
release provision, but rather the determination of what lack of care on
the part of the bank will enable the depositor to overcome use of the
release as a defense.
The apparent confusion surrounding the law pertaining to stop
payment orders afforded the architects of the Uniform Commercial
Code an excellent opportunity to introduce a clear, practical, and equitable solution to a perplexing problem. It should be borne in mind that
simplicity, certainty, and precision are indispensible virtues for laws
governing this complicated and technical area of the commercial world.
The Code should not be a mere restatement of the law, but rather its
purpose, as stated in Section 1-102, should be to establish uniformity
and certainty in the law pertaining to business transactions.' 9 Although
stop payment is only one of many problems treated in the Code, the
measure of success with which its stated objectives are achieved in this
single area is perhaps a reflection on the workability and applicability of
the Code to numerous other commercial transactions.
Section 4-403 categorically states that a depositor has a right to
stop payment on any item payable from his account, if the stop order
is "duly received" by the bank.20 This section codifies the common law
17. Speroff v. First Cent. Trust Co., 149 Ohio 415, 179 N.E.(2d) 119 (1948);
Carroll v. South Carolina National Bank, 211 S.C. 406, 45 S.E.2d 729 (1948).
18. Speroff v. First Cent. Trust Co., 149 Ohio 415, 422, 179 N.E.2d 119, 122 (1948).
19. "Underlying purposes and policies of this Act are (a) to simplify and modernize and develop greater precision and certainty in the rules of law governing com-

mercial transactions; (b) to preserve flexibility in commercial transactions and to encourage continued expansion of the commercial practices and mechanism through
custom, usage and agreement of the parties." UCC § 1-102(2).
20.

"A customer may by order to his bank stop payment of any item payable for

his account but the order must be received at such
afford the bank a reasonable opportunity to act on it
with respect to the item described in Section 4-303."
least two other provisions in the Code applicable to

time and in such manner as to
prior to any action by the bank
UCC § 4-403(1). There are at
stop payment rights which will
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rule. The Code also follows the case law development by substantially
21
adopting the principles of subrogation.
Unlike previous drafts of the Code, no direct reference is made
to the question of a bank's authority to contract or agree with depositors
to limit its obligations with respect to stop payment orders. 22 However, the draftsmen evidently recognized and approved the trend of
those recent cases which indicate that a bank may, to a limited extent,
obtain release from duties otherwise imposed by law. Code Section
4-103 in the final edition states that any provision of Article Four
may be varied by agreement but that no agreement ".

.

. can disclaim

a bank's responsibility or limit the measure of damages for its own
2- 3
lack of good faith or failure to exercise ordinary care."
It is apparent that thus far the Code has effected the compromise
adopted by those courts which recognize release provisions in so far
as they do not excuse liability for negligence. Whether a release executed concurrent with the stop order, rather than at the inception of
the bank-depositor relationship, will fail for want of consideration is
a question left unanswered by the Code.
Those cases which validated release provisions in so far as they
did not exculpate negligent conduct, presented the litigious question
of determining negligence. The Code's 1950 draft provided a simple
answer to this disconcerting question. It would have held the bank
accountable despite the absence of negligence on the theory that any
24
losses thus suffered must be considered a cost of doing business.
not be discussed in the text. "The burden of establishing the fact and amount of loss
resulting from payment of an item contrary to a binding stop payment order is on the
customer." UCC §4-403(3). "The measure of damages for failure to exercise
ordinary care in handling an item is the amount of the item reduced by an amount
which could not have been realized by the use of ordinary care, and where there is bad
faith, it includes other damages, if any, suffered by the party as a proximate consequence." UCC §4-103(5).
21. "If a payor bank has paid an item over the stop payment order of the drawer
or maker or otherwise under circumstances giving a basis for objection by the drawer
or maker, to prevent unjust enrichment and only to the extent necessary to prevent
loss to the bank by reason of its payment of the item, the payor bank shall be subrogated to the rights (a) of any holder in due course on the item against the drawer
or maker; and (b) of the payee or any other holder of the item against the drawer
or maker either on the item or under the transaction out of which the item arose; and
(c) of the drawer or maker against the payee or any other holder of the item with
respect to the transaction out of which the item arose." UCC § 4-407.
22. See UCC § 3-415(4), May, 1949 draft; UCC §4-202(3), Spring, 1950 draft;
UCC § 4-503, September, 1950 draft; UCC § 4-103(1), Spring, 1951 draft. Each of
these provisions was directed specifically to the bank's ability to contract to absolve
itself from liability for paying over a stop order.
23. UCC §4-103(1).
24. UCC §4-202(3) (Spring, 1950 draft). "The position taken by this section
is that stopping payment is a service which depositors expect and are entitled to receive
from banks notwithstanding its difficulty, inconvenience and expense. The inevitable
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One writer, though not in agreement with the Code's earlier
position, admitted that "these provisions, though arbitrarily placing
liability upon the bank, will avoid speculation and litigation involving
25
the vague and nebulous concept of negligence in this situation.
Although the final draft does not impose strict liability, the problem
implicit in allowing liability to turn on negligence is recognized. Thus,
in the evident desire to furnish guidance to 'the banks and the courts,
the Code purports to define the elusive concept of ordinary care. Section
4-103(3) provides that "[a] ction or non-action approved by this Article
or pursuant to Federal Reserve regulations or operating letters constitutes the exercise of ordinary care and, in the absence of special instructions, action or non-action consistent with clearing house rules
and the like or with a general banking usage not disapproved by this
26
Article, prima facie constitutes the exercise of ordinary care."1
Unfortunately, this attempt to define the important phrase "due
care" will be largely ineffectual where stop payment procedure is concerned. There are at present no standard procedures for handling stop
orders.27 In any single community the procedure followed and the
effort made to provide effective stop payment service differs from
bank to bank. Some banks even deem it advisable to use varying procedures as between individual stop orders. 28 Even wider divergence of
method exists between communities and between regions of the counoccasional losses through failure to stop should be borne by the banks as a cost of
the business of banking, and to the extent that they cannot be covered by a charge
made for the service should be covered by banker's insurance, the cost of which is
included in the charges made to all depositors." Comment 2, UCC § 4-202(3) (Spring,
1950 draft).
25. Homer, The Stop Payment Order, 2 BAYLOR L. Rxv. 275, 302 (1950).
Although Homer favored holding the banks liable for paying over a stop order only
when lack of "due diligence" could be shown, he offered no suggestion as to what
conduct would constitute "due diligence."
26. "The term 'general banking usage' is not defined but should be taken to mean
a general usage common to banks in the area concerned. Where the adjective 'general'
is used, the intention is to require a usage broader than a mere practice between two
or three banks, but it is not intended to require anything as broad as a country-wide
usage. A usage followed generally throughout a state, a substantial portion of a state,
a metropolitan area or the like would certainly be sufficient. . . . The confirmation of
ordinary care by compliance with these standards is prima facie only, thus conferring
on the courts the ultimate power to determine ordinary care in any case where it should
appear desirable to do so. The prima facie rule does, however, impose on the party
contesting the standards to establish that they are unreasonable, arbitrary, or unfair."
Comment 4, UCC § 4-103.
27. "Your next inquiry relates to standard procedures in handling stop payment
orders. There is no standard procedure." Communication to the INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
from the American Bankers Association. See also Monthly Charges-30 Day Renwwals
Reduce Work on Stop Payments, Bankers Monthly, Dec., 1949, p. 30.
28. The practice of many banks is to service stop orders where the payee is
unknown or unreliable and to ignore stop orders where the payee is a reliable business
firm. Ibid.
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Federal Reserve regulations make no attempt to control stop
payment procedures; local clearing house associations merely offer
recommendations for alleviation of administrative burdens. The American Bankers Association accepts the divergencies, taking no official
position on uniform procedures with regard to stop payment. 30 Unless
passage of the Code itself supplies the incentive for bankers to initiate
uniform standards of conduct, the Code's attempt to resolve the ordinary care dilemma will be "sound and fury, signifying nothing." Such
a move by bankers is unlikely, particularly when it is considered that
revamping of stop payment procedures would probably entail disturbance of established methods used in allied bank collection problems,
e.g., checking for forgery and insufficient funds.3 1
If uniform procedures are devised, for example, by local clearing
house associations, there is some danger that the methods chosen would
give a minimum of protection to the depositor. Indeed, it can be
argued that the delegation of power to set one's own standard of care
may well subvert the intention of Section 4-403 to accord depositors
an effective stop payment right. 32 On the other hand, there is reason to
believe that banks will not reduce stop payment protection to a
minimum. A bank is, after all, a service enterprise. As is true of
other businesses which depend upon satisfactory service as its prime
attraction for customers, a bank in order to obtain deposit accounts
must render adequate service. Certainly the law was initially instrumental in establishing the stop order as a traditional service expected by
depositors. Today, however, it is important to recognize that the stop
payment right is more than a legal by-product. It is a protection
demanded by depositors which most bankers are willing to afford. 33
The bankers' primary anxiety with respect to stop payment orders
seems to be excessive administrative burdens. 34 In order to minimize
29. Ibid.
30. Communication to the INDIANA LAW JOURNAL from the American Bankers
Association.
31. Some of the reasons for a bank scanning all checks received are as follows:
not sufficient funds; no checking account; account closed; forgery; drawn against uncollected funds; endorsement incomplete; signature not authorized; signature incomplete; signature incorrect; two signatures required; alteration.
32. It would seem, however, that the courts would require any uniform procedures
adopted to represent a bona fide effort to comply with stop payment requests.
33. "Bankers Monthly has not discovered any banker who wants this service on
stop payment eliminated." Laws Can Reduce Stop Payment Work, Bankers Monthly,
July, 1947, p. 311. See also Stop Payment Work Reduced, Bankers Monthly, Sept.,
1947, p. 450.
34. Eight Ways to Ease the Load of Handling Stop Payment Orders, Bankers
Monthly, Nov. 1947, p. 548; Stop Payment Work Simplified, Bankers Monthly, Oct.,
1947, p. 480; Stop Payment Work Reduced, Bankers Monthly, Sept., 1947, p. 450; Laws
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this difficulty, banks have concentrated upon imbuing depositors with a
sense of responsibility in issuing stop orders, by discouraging frivolous
demands for stop payment, and by encouraging notification when need
for the order no longer exists.3 5 Considering that a bank may receive
up to a hundred stop orders a day, and that many of these may remain
on its books indefinitely, 3 6 it is not difficult to sympathize with bankers'
demands for a time limitation on the life of stop orders.3 7 Many states
have enacted such limitations. There is, however, great diversity as to
the time limits, ranging from two months3" to two years.39 This
legislation has somewhat alleviated administration of stop orders and
has provided some assurance that those orders remaining on the books
are in fact guarding against payment of checks which are still endangering the depositor. Bankers consider that a measure of this type
40
provides the greatest relief in this area of the bank collection process.
It is thus significant that the proposed U.C.C. provides for a six month
time limit on stop orders. 41 And, as is true of the Bankers Model Law
42
and most state statutes, the Code permits renewal of stop orders.
To this point it has been assumed that there should be a legal
right to stop payment. It would be remiss, however, not to give at least
passing consideration to the position that stop payment need not be
Can Reduce Stop Payment Work, Bankers Monthly, July, 1947, p. 311; Stop Payments That Stop, Bankers Monthly, Feb., 1937, p. 104.
35. Evidence that many depositors do not use a proper amount of diligence in
writing checks on which they subsequently stop payment tends to induce some sympathy
for the banks. For example, an officer of a bank once requested a 'depositor's
reason for stopping payment. She replied: "'The only way I could get rid of the
salesman was to subscribe to one of his magazines, so I gave him a check.'" Stop
Payments That Stop, Bankers Monthly, Feb., 1937, p. 104.
36. "On a certain week, early in 1947, one Chicago bank received one hundred
stop payment orders each day for seven days. On another occasion this same bank
received a stop payment order on an entire payroll." Stop Payment Work Simplified,
Bankers Monthly, Oct., 1947, p. 480.
37. The position of the bankers is set forth in the Banker's Model Law as follows:
"1. No revocation, countermand or stop payment order relating to the payment of any
check or draft against an account of a depositor in any bank or trust company doing
business in this state shall remain in effect for more than six months after the service
thereof on the bank, unless the same be renewed, which renewals shall be in writing
and which renewals shall be in effect for not more than six months from date of
service thereof on the bank or trust company, but such renewals may be made from
time to time. 2. No notice affecting a check upon which revocation, countermand or
stop payment order has been made at the time of the taking effect of this act shall be
deemed to continue for a period of more than six months thereafter." Laws Can
Reduce Stop Payment Work, Bankers Monthly, July, 1947, p. 311.
38. IoWA CODE ANN. c. 528, § 528.62 (1946) ; TEX. STAT., REV. Civ. art. 342-712
(1948).

39.

VA. CODE

40.
41.
42.

See note 37 supra.
TJCC §4-403(2).
Ibid.

§ 6-73 (1950).
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accorded legal status. Litigation would thus be avoided; banks, governed by the forces of competition, could regulate stop payment as they
deem advisable. Further, if stop payment were totally dispensed with,
payees and business generally would benefit from increased negotiability:
There are several answers to these arguments and in defense of
preserving the legal right to stop payment. The increased negotiability
plea may be balanced by the fact that confidence in the banking system
and in the use of checks is increased by allowing the depositor to retain
a certain degree of control over his checks. Further, the point that
abolishing stop payment rights would eliminate litigation between
depositors and banks is countered by the realization that through the
stop payment device a considerable amount of depositor-payee litigation
is avoided. Since there is usually a valid reason for stopping payment, fulfillment of the order maintains a status quo, thereby making
legal action to protect the depositor's rights unnecessary. Finally, more
compelling reasons must be advanced to justify destruction of the legal
basis for an accepted commercial practice where the impact of such a
change is to a great extent unforeseeable.
It seems that the accepted and better view is that stop payment
should be retained as a legal right for depositors. It may even be
feasibly contended that the stop payment right should be absolute.
The damaging argument against imposing strict liability on the banks,
however, is that it creates excessive administrative burdens for the
banking system. An inevitable effect will thus be to impede, or at
least increase the cost of maintaining, the efficiency of the check
collection system. 43 Further, at least one writer contends that "[t]he
drawer, who placed the check in circulation, should bear his fair share
of the responsibilities and liabilities involved. In most cases, it is the
drawer's conduct that creates the situation making a stop payment
order necessary. He should not be allowed absolute freedom to place
checks in circulation knowing that he can stop payment at any time
with absolute impunity to himself."' 44 This contention is even more
forceful with regard to irresponsible drawers who become habitual
users and abusers of the stop payment right.
Hence, a major concern of the Code is to provide maximum
protection for depositors without imposing undue burdens upon the
banks. Since these objectives will often clash, no legislation can completely satisfy both interests. The Code represents a compromise which
43. Stop Payment Work Simplified, Bankers Monthly, Oct., 1947, p. 480; Stop
Payment Work Reduced, Bankers Monthly, Sept., 1947, p. 450; Laws Can Reduce Stop
Payment Work, Bankers Monthly, July, 1947, p. 311.
44. Horner, supra note 25, at 300.
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experience may prove commendable. Its recognition of a limited
release agreement, coupled with the six month time limitation should
do much to relieve banks' administrative difficulties, without severely
restricting stop payment rights.
That little apparent improvement has been accomplished on the
negligence question cannot be denied. The Code's treatment of "due
care" falls far short of its stated purpose to inject certainty into
commercial transactions. Perhaps legislative particularization of the
negligence concept is not possible in light of inherent differences in
banking procedures. A further disturbing aspect of the "ordinary care"
problem is the realization that determination of the required standard
of conduct will frequently be a prerogative of a jury. However
"good and true" the twelve may be, there is but a faint possibility that
sound and certain commercial decisions will emanate from vacillations
inherent in the jury system.
One certain result of the Code's proposal will be to hinder the
depositor who attempts to prove that his order was paid over because
of the bank's failure to exercise ordinary care. The judiciary or legislature, however, could eliminate this difficult task by holding that mere
proof of payment over a stop order creates a presumption or prima facie
case of negligence. 4 5 The bank would thus be required to come forth
with evidence that it had made a bona fide and reasonable effort to
stop payment, 46 and to explain, if possible, why the order in question
was violated. This requirement seems fair, since these matters are
within the sole knowledge of the bank. Such a procedure would reduce
the conjectural element present in stop order litigation; the courts,
aided by more complete information pertaining to banking procedures
45. This approach, somewhat analogous to the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur,
has been suggested as a remedy for a similar problem in the Uniform Bank Collection

Act. "A bank should be liable as an insurer but if such a rule is not invoked the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, which would make the bank prima facie liable on proof
of loss, at least should be codified here." Beutel, The Proposed Uniform Bank Collec-

Fion Act and Possibility of Recodijication of the Law on Negotiable Instruments, 9
TULANE

L. REV. 378, 404 (1934-35).

46. Under UCC § 4-103(3) proof that the bank's efforts conformed to a general

banking usage would create a prima facie, not a conclusive, presumption of ordinary
care. Thus the bank would set forth the procedures it employed in attempting to
catch the fugitive check, and then would endeavor to demonstrate that these procedures

approximate those used by nearly all the banks in its commerc'al area. in most jurisdictions, this would offset the suggested presumption in favor of the depositor, leaving
the case to be decided upon proven specific acts of negligence, or proof that the general

banking usage itself fails to measure up to the standard of care.
Since the provision requires a significant amount of explanation and proof by the
bank before it may be utilized, it should not frustrate the purpose of the suggested

presumption in favor of the depositor. Moreover, as po:nted out earlier in the text, there
are at present no general banking usages in regard to stop payment procedures; it is,

therefore, unlikely that the bank could take advantage of this provision.
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could better develop a more certain and predictable pattern of conduct
required of banks than now exists. It seems that this approach at least
deserves a fair test. If experience proves it to be unworkable, and
confusion still prevails, then in the interest of achieving certainty and
consistency, it may perhaps be desirable to restore strict liability.
One final lesson may be deduced from this study of,the proposed
Code as it relates to stop payment rights: Legislation which attempts to
regulate commercial practices infrequently achieves with a high degree
of satisfaction its announced purposes of providing certainty, simplicity,
and a proper balance between individual rights and commercial expediency.
The difficulties inherent in ascertaining the impact of the various
suggested controls for complicated commercial operations makes legislation at best a calculated guess as to what is most desirable. There
will inevitably appear compelling arguments for a different approach
or for a readjustment of duties and liabilities. This predicament must
be tolerated until legislative methods are devised which will allow for
more definite comprehension of exactly what consequences will follow
from the alternative proposals. Perhaps, a closer approximation of
legislative methods with those of the natural and social sciences will
uncover the data necessary to achieve this end.4 7 Then legislation in
this area can be based on even more certain grounds than the ". .. time

and thought from a great many people well informed in both the
business and the legal sides of the [commercial] fields. .. .

SAMUEL E. PERKINS: A JUDGE IN POLITICS*
Remembered today for his long tenure on the Indiana Supreme
Court and for his competence as a legal craftsman, Samuel Elliot Perkins
was in his own lifetime famous-indeed notorious-for entirely different reasons. 1 During the Civil War years, although a member of the
47. For example, future efforts to draft legislation for banking operations might
benefit from more systematic study and analysis of actual banking practices. An intensive scanning of the varied practices used in the many banks, perhaps even time-motion
studies of employee functions, would certainly give more accurate content to the vague
phrase "administrative burden."
48. Goodrich, Foreword to the UNIFORM. COMMERCIAIL CODE VI (Text And Comments Edition, 1952).
* This paper was completed as part of the requirements in 3rd year Legal
History by Hugh P. Husband, Jr. A.B. 1949, J.D. 1952, Indiana University.
1. Lawyer, newspaper editor, and devotee of the Democratic party, in 1843
Perkins at the age of 34 was appointed to the Supreme Court. In addition to his
judicial duties, Perkins taught law at Northwestern Christian University in Indian-

